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1 Introduction 
“Disruption” might be the most overused and misused term in today’s business jargon (Ig-
natius, 2015). Numerous innovators have been using the term to describe the impact of 
their products and services. The term originally goes back to Clayton Christensen’s The In-
novator’s Dilemma from 1995. In this work, he defined how, in the process of disruption, 
initially insignificant and underestimated innovations threaten to displace industry leading 
incumbents (Christensen & Matzler, 2013).  
The blockchain technology, too, is often referred to as a potential disruption (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2016). The technology uses mass collaboration and computer code to establish 
trust. It is an almost incorruptible distributed ledger technology (DLT) that can document 
transactions between several parties efficiently and in a verifiable, permanent, and decen-
tralized manner (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017). While the technology first became famous 
through its use in the underlying mechanics of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin starting in 2008, 
companies from many different industries have been investigating the benefits of the 
blockchain technology for their own uses. 
This paper aims at connecting the frequent misuse of the term disruptive innovation and 
the common use of the term in reference to blockchain. By looking at the characteristics of 
a disruption process and by analyzing the impact the blockchain technology has had, and 
will continue to have, this work tries to answer the following research question:  
Does the Blockchain Technology have the Potential to be truly Disruptive (especially in the 
Financial Industry)? 
To answer this question, the emphasis has been placed on identifying potential indicators 
of disruption within different applications of the blockchain technology. The following fig-
ure presents the schematic structure of this thesis. 
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Figure 1. Schematic Structure of the Paper 
The chapter succeeding this introduction presents Christensen’s disruption theory. Besides 
an explanation of the concept, the chapter also introduces five features that characterize the 
process of disruption. The third chapter is dedicated to blockchain technology. In addition 
to its history and the mechanics of the technology, this section provides a literature over-
view about the potential impact of the technology and its applications. The main analysis is 
conducted in chapters four to seven. While chapters four, five, and six each deal with the 
disruptive impact of the DLT especially in the financial industry, chapter seven evaluates 
and interprets the results of the preceding chapters.  
For chapters four to six, one example from each field of application is selected and tested 
for indicators of disruption. Therefore, the five characteristics of disruption serve as the un-
derlying framework for the analysis. First, the potentially disruptive impact of blockchain-
based cryptocurrencies on payment methods is tested. Second, blockchain’s ability to dis-
place intermediaries was analyzed by looking at the use of blockchain-based, intermediat-
ing platforms in microgrids. And thirdly, the implementation of blockchain solutions for 
health record management was considered to determine if the technology indicates disrup-
tion potentials for data transfer and storage. The results of each of the three applications are 
assessed in the seventh chapter with the aim of identifying common patterns and assessing 
the overall impact of the technology. Finally, the last chapter examines the value of the re-
sults, talks about limitations of this thesis, and makes suggestions for further research on 
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the topic. Throughout the paper, the citation style of the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA) is used for referencing. 
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2 Definition and Characteristics of a Disruptive Innovation 
In his book The Innovator’s Dilemma, Clayton M. Christensen introduced the disruption 
theory (Christensen & Matzler, 2013). Analyzing the failure of industry leading compa-
nies, he defined the characteristics of a disruptive innovation and, thus, coined the term. 
While the theory is still commonly accepted in its original form, some critique has surfaced 
over time and the theory has been adjusted, accordingly (Denning, 2016). 
2.1 Explanation of Key Terms 
2.1.1 Value Networks 
Since a disruptive innovation has its origins outside the value networks of established play-
ers in a market and causes new value networks to emerge, understanding the term is crucial 
(Christensen & Matzler, 2013). The initial idea of a value network is based on Dosi’s defi-
nition of technological paradigms as a solution for selected technological problems (Dosi, 
1982). However, with respect to disruption, the idea of value networks was coined by 
Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) in the context of competition and the context of solv-
ing its customers’ problems. Based on a company’s past choices and its historic competi-
tive strategies, its value network can be defined. Within the network, values derive from 
various actions such as the decisions of which markets to serve, how to respond to custom-
ers’ needs, and how to react to competitors (Christensen & Matzler, 2013). Moreover, de-
termining the firm’s perception of economic value for new technologies, the value net-
work, among other factors, indicates how successfully a company can innovate (Christen-
sen & Rosenbloom, 1995). Based on the expected reward of investing in an innovation for 
a company’s value network, the company will decide pro or con an innovation. 
2.1.2 Incumbents 
An incumbent is defined as a company which has a sizable share of a market (“Incum-
bent”, n.d.). Under threat of being displaced in the mainstream market by the disruptive 
technology, incumbents play a key role in the respective theory and the process of disrup-
tion (Tellis, 2006). Having led their fields and industries for years, incumbents were role 
model companies that many other industry participants looked up to (Christensen & 
Matzler, 2013). Many incumbents became successful because of their innovative products 
and services. Thus, their strategies are copied and implemented by others. While a com-
pany’s failure can often be attributed to poor management and investing, to arrogance, or 
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to a lack of capabilities, a typical incumbent does not fail for such reasons. The reasons for 
the failure of incumbents are explored by Christensen’s 1995 disruption theory. 
2.1.3 Trajectory of Technological Improvement 
Like the concept of the value network, the idea of technological trajectories goes back to 
Dosi (1982). Technological trajectories describe a path along which technological im-
provement and innovation takes place. They indicate the speed of technological improve-
ment, like the development in microprocessors exemplifies: from 1979 to 1994, the speed 
of microprocessors improved by 20% annually, from 8MHz to 133MHz (Christensen & 
Matzler, 2013). For incumbents in particular, technological trajectories are of utmost im-
portance. Their customers base their expectations on these trajectories of improvement, and 
consequently, it is the company’s task to fulfill them. However, the focus on fulfilling their 
customer’s expectations regarding existing technologies makes it likely that they miss out 
on new, disruptive technologies. 
2.2 Characteristics of the Process of Disruption 
2.2.1 Overview on Clayton Christensen´s Disruption Theory 
In 1995, Christensen published his famous book The Innovator’s Dilemma in which he 
presents his theory of disruptive innovation together with advice for managers how to deal 
with such situations (Christensen & Matzler, 2013). Since then, the theory has been estab-
lished as a guideline for both small entrepreneurs who gather hope for their own business 
ideas, and for executives of leading incumbents who try to defend the market leading posi-
tion of their companies against disruptive intruders (Christensen, Raynor, & McDonald, 
2015).  
In the process of disruption, an insignificant company with little resources manages to 
challenge and to displace the market leaders (Christensen et al., 2015). The underlying rea-
son for the failure of established incumbents is their focus on improving existing products 
and services based on their most profitable customers’ demands. Consequently, they tend 
to overemphasize the needs of some segments, while they miss out on the needs of others. 
These ignored segments are those targeted by entrants, which later turn out to be disrup-
tive. They successfully manage to establish themselves in these segments by providing a 
more suitable functionality of their product or service. Generally, these products and ser-
vices look financially unattractive for incumbents as their main customers will not demand 
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these technologies yet because, at this point, the new technology does not fulfill the re-
quirements of the mainstream market, which are based on technological trajectories 
(Bower & Christensen, 1995). However, the new entrants keep improving their perfor-
mance until, at some point, they meet the requirements and demands of the mainstream 
market, too. At the same time, they manage to preserve the underlying advantages for their 
earlier success. In the process of disruption, usually, it is not until this point that the incum-
bents start exploring and investing in the new technologies. However, the technological ad-
vantage the new entrant has over the incumbents for the new technology is often too big, 
and the incumbents get displaced. 
A very tangible, historic example of a disruptive technology is the steam boat (Christensen 
& Matzler, 2013). In 1783, the first functioning steam boat was built. However, at that 
point and for the following decades, it was not competitive against sailing boats in most as-
pects. The cost per mile was higher, the speed of travel was slower, and they were a lot 
more vulnerable. However, unlike sailing boats, steam boats can travel rivers up and down-
stream, even without wind. At that time, however, the main customers of the boat manu-
factures required boats that were able to cross oceans, which steam boats of the day were 
unable to do. Therefore, the manufacturers kept focusing on sailing boats and ignored the 
steam boat segment. However, the steam boats kept improving and at some point in the late 
19th century, they were competitive in the mainstream market. By then, it was too late for 
the incumbent sailing boat manufactures to adapt to the disruptive technology, which is 
why they were displaced, at the end 
2.2.2 General Pattern of the Process of Disruption 
The so-called “technology mudslide hypothesis” has been a widely accepted explanation 
for the failure of companies (Christensen & Matzler, 2013). The hypothesis simply as-
sumes that companies fail because they are not able to keep up with the technological pro-
gress. However, with his disruption theory, Christensen indicated that well-managed, re-
nowned companies can fail even if they manage to keep up technologically with the pace 
and the complexity of innovations.  
Indeed, it is crucial for the success of a business to listen to its customers and to fulfill their 
demands and expectations. Therefore, a company’s value network, among other aspects, is 
shaped by the customers a company serves, by how it responds to customers’ needs, and by 
how it reacts to its competitors. The customers expect products and services to improve 
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along an existing technological trajectory, which could be a certain percentage of perfor-
mance improvement in a given period. Therefore, incumbents focus on improving their 
services based on what their most profitable customers demand (Christensen et al., 2015). 
This innovation, along existing trajectories, is referred to as evolutionary innovation and, at 
first, seems to be what any incumbent should be doing in order to defend its market leading 
position (Christensen & Matzler, 2013). However, many incumbents have failed even 
though they followed trajectories and patterns that helped them to achieve the leading posi-
tion they held in the past. 
These companies have failed because of disruptive innovations, which are different to evo-
lutionary innovations in that they create new technological trajectories. Disruptive innova-
tions are commonly characterized by a different package of performance attributes (Bower 
& Christensen, 1995). These attributes are often of a technological nature and can result in 
a reduced price or might be valued by market segments other than the mainstream seg-
ments. In order for an innovation to be considered disruptive, its performance and capabil-
ity ought not necessarily to meet the demands of the mainstream customers when the inno-
vation is first released. As the new performance attributes of such innovations are, at the 
outset, not valued by incumbents’ existing customers, disruptive technologies look finan-
cially unattractive to established companies and are therefore often ignored (Christensen & 
Matzler, 2013). Due to this, Christensen calls incumbents prisoners of their own customer.   
One reason that makes the success of disruptive technologies possible is that products and 
services are innovated at a faster pace than the mainstream market demands (Christensen et 
al., 2015). Therefore, incumbents put efforts into improving attributes to a level that is not 
required. Disruptive technologies, too, improve at a faster pace than the demand of the 
mainstream market, which enables these technologies to eventually fulfill these expecta-
tions (Christensen & Matzler, 2013). At this point incumbents might still offer a higher 
performance than the new entrants, but since the mainstream market can be satisfied with 
the lower performance, the new entrant displaces the incumbent. Often, it takes too long 
for incumbents to realize the threat of the new entrant due to the different product or ser-
vice attribute of the entrant. Some incumbents still try to adapt to the new technological 
trajectory, but very few succeed as the entrant’s advantage in the new technology is usually 
too high. 
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Figure 2. Schematic Display of Disruption Process (Christensen, & Matzler, 2013, p.7) 
Figure 2 indicates how the performance of technology increases at a faster pace than de-
mand in the respective market segments. While incumbents focus on evolutionary innova-
tion in order to meet the most profitable customers’ demands, the performance of the new 
entrant’s disruptive technology is relatively weaker, and it targets less profitable market 
segments. However, the entrant’s technology keeps improving and eventually it will meet 
the demands of the mainstream segments. Once this happens, the incumbents are displaced 
and the market has been disrupted. 
2.2.3 Five Characteristics of a Disruptive Innovation 
Christensen’s initial version of The Innovator’s Dilemma had quite an impact on the pro-
cess of innovating and on reacting to innovations. However, while this initial version no-
ticeably and in detail described the process of disruption, there is some ambiguity in its ex-
act definitions (Tellis, 2006). For this reason, Tellis summarized Christensen’s theory into 
five important characteristics that are displayed in Table 1. Christensen added these in later 
versions of his book (Christensen & Matzler, 2013). 
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Table 1. Five Characteristics of Disruption (Tellis, 2006, p.34) 
2.2.4 Different Types of Innovation 
Unlike in the initial version of The Innovator’s Dilemma, in his book The Innovator’s Solu-
tion, Christensen differentiates between two types of disruptive innovations based on the 
target market of a product (Christensen, 2003). There are Low Market Disruptions on the 
one hand and New Market Disruptions on the other, which can be distinguished by the in-
novation’s target customer group.1 Besides these two types of disruptive innovations, 
Christensen discusses Sustaining Innovations, which focus on permanently improving 
products for an incumbent’s most profitable customers (Denning, 2016). 
2.3 Critique of the Theory 
In 2015, Christensen wrote that his “disruption theory is in danger of becoming a victim of 
its own success” (Christensen et al., 2015, p.44). Being extremely popular, the initial for-
                                                 
 
1 Exhibit 1 in the appendix presents the differences between these two types in detail. 
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mulation of the theory often overshadows updates of it. Consequently, issues that have al-
ready been addressed are critiqued repeatedly. Ambiguity in the exact definition of disrup-
tion has been subject to much criticism, although Christensen added the five characteristics 
of disruptive innovation in a later version of his theory (Christensen & Matzler, 2013; Tel-
lis, 2006).  
Besides the lack of clarity in the initial definition of the theory, its usefulness to make ex-
ante predictions has been questioned (Danneels, 2004). All the case studies Christensen 
used in his theory are successful examples of disruptive innovations which is why he has 
been accused of cherry-picking his examples. To be of use for managers, it is important for 
a framework to allow accurate decisions. However, very often, it is only possible after-
wards to judge whether it was right or not to pursue or ignore an emerging technology 
(Doering & Parayre, 2000). Using Christensen’s theory, mangers will have problems pre-
dicting the development of what customers will demand in the future, despite technological 
trajectories (Danneels, 2004). 
As aforementioned, Christensen points out that one reason for the failure of incumbents is 
that they listen too carefully to their customers (Bower & Christensen, 1995). Therefore, 
his work has been referred to as an argument against customer orientation (Day, 1999). 
Slater and Narver (1998) opposed Christensen’s claim that incumbents are prisoners of 
their own customers by stating that a truly customer-oriented firm understands its custom-
ers’ needs, even if they do not specifically express these needs.2 
Additionally, research suggests that innovations which ultimately transform an industry 
originate from incumbents most of the time (Cooper & Schendel, 1976). Moreover, there is 
evidence that, unlike Christensen claimed, there are also incumbents that succeed, despite 
disruptive innovations (King & Tucci, 2002). Contradicting Christensen’s theory, King and 
Tucci found that incumbents are likely to enter niche segments of a market as well. As it 
seems that many, but not all, incumbents fail when a disruptive technology emerges, Chris-
tensen is critiqued for not answering the question: What ultimately determines if incum-
bents fail or succeed against disruptive innovations (Danneels, 2004)? Nevertheless, Chris-
                                                 
 
2 Christensen’s response to this critique is outlined in Exhibit 2 in the appendix. 
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tensen’s adjustments regarding the possibility of Efficiency Innovations and Continuous In-
novations ensured the temporality of his theory, thus allowing it to serve as a basis for the 
subsequent analysis (Tellis, 2006).  
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3 Blockchain Technology: Underlying Technology, Potential Impact, and Ap-
plication 
3.1 Explanation of the Blockchain Technology 
3.1.1 General Overview 
In 1991, Haber and Stornetta first proposed the idea of cryptographic timestamps for secur-
ing digital data into a network of blocks (Haber & Stornetta, 1991). However, it was not 
until 2008 when this was initially implemented for setting up a blockchain for transactions 
of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin by its inventor, who worked under the pseudonym Satoshi 
Nakamoto (2008). While the Bitcoin itself hit the financial services industry several years 
ago, companies from many different industries have been focusing on the benefits of 
blockchain. Besides its use as the underlying technology of cryptocurrencies, blockchain 
provides great benefits if used as an intermediary or for data management. According to a 
prediction by the World Economic Forum (WEF), 10% of global gross domestic product 
(GDP) will be stored on blockchains by 2025, indicating how great the potential impact of 
the technology is (WEF, 2015). 
In its most simplified form, blockchain uses mass collaboration and computer code to es-
tablish trust. Blockchain is an incorruptible DLT that can document transactions between 
several parties efficiently and in a verifiable, permanent, and decentralized way (Iansiti & 
Lakhani, 2017). These transactions can range from money and financial assets, such as 
stocks and bonds, to intellectual property or votes (FCCCO, 2018). The trust in the tech-
nology does not derive from banks, governments, or third-party intermediaries but from 
systematic network consensus, collaboration, and cryptography. Following the protocol of 
a blockchain for inter-node3 communication and validation of new blocks, the blockchain 
is managed collectively by a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network (Iansiti & Lakhani, 2017). In or-
der to change data recorded in any given block, all subsequent blocks of the chain must be 
altered, which requires approval of the network majority. Due to the nature of its structure, 
blockchain is considered to be one of the safest ways to secure transactions (IBM, 2017). 
                                                 
 
3 All participants in a Blockchain are referred to as nodes. 
 13 
3.1.2 Mechanics of the Technology 
Like a public ledger, blockchain can be regarded as a sequence of blocks, each of which 
contains a complete record of past transactions (Lee, 2015). The sequence keeps growing 
continuously every time a new block is added to it. Each block, which is basically a data 
package, can be subdivided into two parts, namely block header and block body. The block 
body comprises the information of all the blockchain’s transactions (Nofer, Gomber, Hinz, 
& Schiereck, 2017). The block header includes the Block Version, the Parent Block Hash, 
the Merkle Tree Root Hash, a Timestamp, the nBits, and a Nonce (Zheng, Xie, Dai, Chen, 
& Wang, 2018). The table below provides explanations and functions of these terms: 
Element of Block Header Explanation 
- Block Version “Indicates which set of block validation rules to follow” 
- Parent Block Hash “A 256-bit hash value that points to the previous block” 
- Merkle Tree Root “The hash value of all the transactions in the block” 
- Timestamp “Current timestamp as seconds since 1970-01-01T00:00 UTC” 
- nBits “Current hashing target in a compact format” 
- Nonce “A 4-byte field, which usually starts with 0 and increases for 
every hash calculation” 
Table 2. Elements of Block Header (Zheng et al., 2018, p.355) 
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According to Zheng et al. (2018) the structure of a block in the sequence can be illustrated 
in form of the figure below: 
 
Figure 3. Block Structure (Zheng et al., 2018, p.356) 
In the figure, the transactions of the blockchain in the block body are referred to as TX1, 
TX2, …, TXN. These transactions can be subdivided into transactions and counter transac-
tions. To validate the authentication of transactions, the DLT uses an asymmetric cryptog-
raphy mechanism (Omohundro, 2014).  
Both, the block size and the size of each transaction determine the maximum number of 
transactions a single block can contain (Zheng et al., 2018). A hash converts letters and 
numbers into an encrypted output of a predetermined length. The algorithms that are used 
to create hash values ensure the integrity of the blockchain (Nofer et al., 2017). Since the 
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values are unique, changes of a block in the chain would immediately change the respec-
tive hash value. This way, the hash value effectively prevents fraud. To indicate the inter-
connectedness of blocks in a blockchain, the figure below outlines how the parent block 
hash always references to the previous block in the sequence (Zheng et al., 2018). Referred 
to as Genesis Block, the first block in the block chain is the only block without a parent 
block. 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of a Blockchain (Zheng et al., 2018, p.355) 
In order for a new block to be added to the chain, the majority of, if not all, nodes in the 
network need to agree by a consensus mechanism on the validity of the transactions in a 
block and on the validity of the block itself (Nofer et al., 2017). Consequently, new trans-
actions are stored in a block for a certain time before being added to the distributed ledger 
due to the consensus process. The creation of blocks is usually carried out by so called 
miners who are rewarded for the validation with cryptocurrencies.  
There are multiple approaches to consensus, such as Proof of Work (PoW), Proof of Stake 
(PoS), and Practical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT), all of which are varying in their na-
ture of verifying blocks (Zheng et al., 2018). Exhibit 3 in the appendix further elaborates 
on these three consensus mechanisms. Once the information is verified and a block is 
added to the blockchain, the information can no longer be changed without the consensus 
of the nodes in the P2P network (Nofer et al., 2017).  
Due to the nature of its technology, blockchain is characterized by four principles, which 
are Decentralization, Persistency, Anonymity, and Auditability (Zheng et al., 2018). More-
over, blockchain systems can be subdivided into three types, which are Public Blockchain, 
Private Blockchain, and Consortium Blockchain (Buterin, 2015). The principles and types 
are examined in Exhibit 4 and 5 in the appendix.  
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3.2 Potential Impact of the Blockchain Technology 
As only ten years have passed since its implementation in 2008, it is difficult to tell 
whether blockchain will become a universal underlying technology behind a rejuvenated 
sharing economy, or whether it will just be beneficial for selected applications. There are 
voices conceding its potential to replace escrow services, but at the same time, other voices 
question if blockchain really is a cheaper, more secure, and easier solution than using a 
trusted third party (Comm, 2018).  
However, most of the research provides a rather optimistic outlook. For example Tapscott 
and Tapscott (2016), who suggest that blockchain has the potential to disrupt any industry 
and to create a world in which people get to participate in the value that they create. The 
WEF suggests that 10% of the global GDP will be stored on blockchains by 2025 (WEF, 
2015). The German consulting firm Roland Berger GmbH (2017), believes that companies 
who fail to implement blockchain in the future are at risk of losing tremendous amounts of 
market share within their industry. Indeed, blockchain represents a fundamentally new op-
portunity for businesses with its ability to cut out third parties. Especially the transaction-
heavy financial services industry has the potential to be impacted tremendously by the 
DLT (Zheng et al., 2018). 
Smart Contracts further increase the potential reach of blockchain. Based on a block-
chain’s transaction protocol, Smart Contracts are self-executing contracts (Voshmgir, 
2016). Therefore, a transaction is only executed once all participants of a transaction meet 
pre-determined transaction rules. These rules are integrated in the program code of the 
Smart Contract. Transaction partners do not need a centralized third party any longer, since 
trust in the other participants is ensured by the Smart Contract. 
Besides the aforementioned advantages, which derive from the technology’s characteris-
tics, blockchain will not lose its functionalities if some nodes in the network break down. 
This makes the technology extremely reliable, thus increasing its potential (Nofer et al., 
2017). All of these benefits and the capability of Smart Contracts suggest an enormous po-
tential for the technology, especially as underlying technology for cryptocurrencies or in its 
ability to store data and to function as an intermediary. 
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3.3 Application of the Blockchain Technology 
In 2017 alone, more than $1 billion was invested into blockchain startups worldwide across 
many different industries (CB Insights, n.d.).45 In addition to this, many established com-
panies invested millions of dollars into research and development (R&D) of the technology 
(Tama et al., 2017). However, many startups working on blockchain applications have not 
implemented their solutions yet, which makes it harder to assess the impact and potential 
of the technology. Nonetheless, a substantial number of blockchain solutions and applica-
tions have already been implemented successfully. 
The financial services industry is not just among the industries that are believed to be im-
pacted most by blockchain (Tama et al., 2017). It is also an industry in which the technol-
ogy has already been applied widely. Since blockchain was initially introduced as the un-
derlying technology of Bitcoin, its most common application to this point has been in cryp-
tocurrencies. Bitcoin’s cumulative market capitalization was $66 billion in December 2018 
(Blockchain, n.d.). 
Besides its application for cryptocurrencies, the blockchain technology is already used in 
other areas as well. For example, blockchain and Smart Contracts are applied by Internet-
of-Things (IoT)6 platforms, such as Slock, a bicycle rental platform, that allows its custom-
ers to unlock a smart lock after both parties fulfilled the pre-determined terms of a Smart 
Contract (Rampton, 2018). In manufacturing, blockchain is used for numerous different 
purposes. Blockverify (2018), for example, provides a blockchain-based anti-counterfeit 
solution that identifies counterfeit products, diverted goods, stolen merchandise, and fraud-
ulent transactions. Among the products for which this solution can be used are pharmaceu-
ticals, luxury items, diamonds, and electronics. Transparency of the supply-chain is also 
the primary goal of numerous other blockchain-based approaches (Marr, 2018). Besides 
these and other applications in the presented fields, blockchain is applied in areas such as 
Cybersecurity, Healthcare, Government, Charity, Retail, Real Estate, as well as Transport 
and Tourism. 
                                                 
 
4 Exhibit 6 provides and overview over the industries blockchain could potentially disrupt. 
5 The development of investments in blockchain startups is presented in Exhibit 7 in the appendix. 
6 IoT applications are designed to create smart spaces between everyday objects that are interconnected and 
communicate via the internet (Mukhopadhyay, 2014). 
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4 Disruptive Impact of Blockchain as the Underlying Technology for Payment 
Methods 
4.1 General Overview of Payment Methods 
The volume of global online purchases has increased tremendously in recent years and is 
expected to reach $4 trillion in 2020 (eMarketer, n.d.). Electronic payment providers, such 
as PayPal, have become popular and threats to established incumbents such as Mastercard 
and Visa (“Impact of PayPal, Google, Amazon & Emerging Payment Providers on Visa, 
MasterCard & Payments Industry”, 2010) are evident. Even Cryptocurrencies, such as 
Bitcoin, are already the preferred payment method for 2% of all online shoppers (CIGI, 
n.d.). The figure below indicates the preferred payment methods for online purchases 
worldwide as of March 2017. 
 
Figure 5. Preferred Payment Methods of Online Shoppers Worldwide as of March 2017 (CIGI, n.d.) 
However, the preferred payment methods vary a lot between different geographical regions 
and cultures. Credit cards, for example, were used for only 11% of online purchases in 
Germany in 2017 (EHI Retail Institute, n.d.). In the US, they were used for 29% of online 
purchases in the same period (Wirecard, n.d.). Moreover, research indicates that the costs 
of different payment methods for retailers vary significantly, based on the amount owed by 
the customer (Grüschow, Kemper, & Brettel, 2016). 
Credit cards
22%
Electronic payment 
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available)
21%
Debit cards
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Cash on delivery
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Bank transfers
11%
Gift cards or 
vouchers
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Mobile payment
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In order to analyze the potentially disruptive impact blockchain might have on payment 
methods, it is necessary to look at what characteristics customers value when it comes to 
selecting a payment option. The annual Survey of Consumers Payment Coice (SCPC) by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston found that among other factors, the security, the cost, 
and the convenience of a payment method are the key dimensions for most customers 
(Greene & Stavins, 2018). Therefore, these factors will be considered in the analysis. The 
following table provides further details on each of the three dimensions: 
Factor Explanation 
Security Consumers are worried about data insecurity and fraud 
when paying online (Kwon & Lee, 2003). Research found 
that 66% of consumers are “extremely” or “very” con-
cerned about their bankcard data being stolen or abused 
(“2018 UNISYS Security Index”, 2018). 
Cost “The cost of payment instruments is one of the most im-
portant characteristics affecting payment choice” (Stavins, 
2017, p.15). Among the costs that are significant for ex-
plaining consumers’ choice of payment method are: oppor-
tunity cost, transaction cost, and handling cost (Klee, 2008). 
Convenience Besides the complexity of a payment method, its conven-
ience is particularly influenced by its speed (Schuh & 
Stavins, 2015). However, at a certain level of convenience, 
the security might potentially be impacted.  
Table 3. Factors Impacting Payment Selection 
4.2 The Influence Blockchain has on Payment Methods 
In the form of cryptocurrencies, the blockchain technology has started to impact consum-
ers’ payment choices in recent years. Due to its decentralized mechanics that make it al-
most impossible to change a transaction record, blockchain is one of the most attractive 
technologies for developing new payment methods (Brown, 2018). It is believed to im-
prove the security, increase the speed, and reduce the cost of transactions. These benefits 
derive from the technology’s ability to facilitate P2P and direct transactions as well as 
cross-border and cross-currency transactions (Yuan & Wang, 2018). 
Additionally, there are numerous other applications of the blockchain technology that im-
pact payment methods. Ripple, for example, has been using blockchain to make cash trans-
fers more efficient (“One Frictionless Experiment to Send Money Globally”, 2018). Using 
the DLT, they created a network, which connects banks and payment providers to enable 
its users to send and receive money. 
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While many people became aware of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies as alternative in-
vestments, few have yet been using it as a method to pay (CIGI, n.d.). It remains to be 
seen, to what extent the crash of Bitcoin in 2018 has had a negative impact on the reputa-
tion of cryptocurrencies. Thus, it is possible that customers might abstain from using cryp-
tocurrencies for payments in the future, or that they first resort to other means of more con-
ventional cashless payments. Nonetheless, it seems possible that the blockchain technol-
ogy, in the form of cryptocurrencies, could turn out to be disruptive for payment methods.  
4.3 Example of Application: Cryptocurrencies 
To analyze whether the blockchain technology may have a disruptive impact on payment 
methods, we will analyze cryptocurrencies more in detail.7 We will do so by assessing the 
extent of how cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin in particular, fulfill the previously introduced five 
characteristics of disruption by Tellis (2016).  
4.3.1 Overview Cryptocurrencies 
In early 2019, the cumulative market capitalization of cryptocurrencies was estimated to be 
$128,848,088,183 and the number of cryptocurrencies to be 2,082 (“Top 100 Cryptocur-
rencies by Market Capitalization”, 2019). With its share of more than 51%, Bitcoin domi-
nates the market. The initial cryptocurrency is followed by Ethereum and XRP with market 
shares of 12% and 11% respectively.8 As aforementioned, the creation of cryptocurrencies 
goes back to Nakamoto (2008). On January 4, 2009, he created the genesis block of the 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin, and a week later he sent ten Bitcoins to another cryptographer, 
which is generally considered the first transaction with a cryptocurrency (Yuan & Wang, 
2018). More than a year later, in May 2010, a programmer used 10,000 Bitcoin to buy two 
pizzas for $25, giving the Bitcoin its initial exchange rate. Since then, the value of the 
cryptocurrency has increased to almost $20,000 for one Bitcoin in late 2017. However, this 
rapid increase was succeeded by a drastic crash taking the price of one Bitcoin down to 
$3,790 as of January 4, 2019 from a maximum of $19,783.06 on December 17, 2017(Dax-
hammer & Facsar, 2018; “Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization”, 2019). 
                                                 
 
7 The scope of this paper does not allow for an analysis of every application with which blockchain could po-
tentially disrupt currencies. 
8 Exhibit 8 in the appendix provides an overview over the leading cryptocurrencies. 
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Each cryptocurrency has slightly different mechanics but usually with the following com-
ponents: a public shared blockchain ledger, a distributed P2P networking system, a decen-
tralized consensus algorithm, a well-designed economic incentive mechanism, and pro-
grammable Smart Contracts (Yuan & Wang, 2018). Cryptocurrencies are generated in dis-
tributed systems and their issuance relies on a consensus process within a P2P network in-
stead of a central authority. Bitcoin, for example, relies on PoW-based mining. Its miners 
in the P2P network compete to create new blocks in the chain, which include the latest 
transactions. The winning miner of the consensus competition gains the right to create this 
block and is rewarded with Bitcoin if it is approved by other nodes and included in the 
main chain.  
This incentive also encourages other miners to contribute their computing power to the net-
work. The approval by a certain number of nodes in the P2P networks and the use of cryp-
tography with each transaction being hashed, ensure that the transactions are valid and that 
no alterations in the transactions can be made afterwards. The use of Smart Contracts al-
lows the automatic circulation of cryptocurrencies. 
4.3.2 Is Blockchain Potentially Disruptive for Payment Methods? 
4.3.2.1 Initial Performance 
According to Tellis’ five characteristics of disruption (2006), a disruptive product or ser-
vice is, among other factors, defined by its initial performance. When it is launched, it un-
derperforms in at least one criterion that has been historically valued by mainstream cus-
tomers compared to an incumbent’s product or service. Therefore, three criteria that are 
valued by customers when it comes to selecting a payment method have been determined 
in section 4.1 based on a literature review. To recapitulate, these criteria are the security, 
the cost, and the convenience of a payment method (Greene & Stavins, 2018): 
Security: When shopping online, the safest payment method is paying cash at delivery, as 
no bank account information is ever published on the internet. However, when it comes to 
paying online, the underlying DLT of most cryptocurrencies makes the actual payment 
safer than most other transaction methods (IBM, 2017). This is due to the replacement of 
third-party intermediaries by a systematic network consensus and cryptography. However, 
the security of cryptocurrencies and most other forms of online payment is threatened by 
increased computational power and advanced cryptanalysis (Giechaskiel, Cremers, & Ras-
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mussen, 2018). The tremendous increase in value of many cryptocurrencies serves as a fur-
ther incentive for people to attempt breaking the highly complex and secure blockchains 
behind cryptocurrencies. Another risk of paying with cryptocurrencies derives from its 
novelty. Unlike with credit or debit cards there are no laws and regulations in place that 
specify the rights and responsibilities of each party in the transaction (Quora, 2018). If 
credit card information is used fraudulently, for example, the owner’s liability is limited by 
a legal framework. However, this is not the case with cryptocurrencies due to the absence 
of intermediaries and the fact that they were particularly designed to operate independently 
of any regulatory structure. Consequently, it could be argued that, despite its complexity 
and its cryptography, the initial performance of cryptocurrencies regarding their safety is 
weaker than the safety of dominant payment methods at this point. 
Cost: Due to the necessity of third-party intermediaries, the customer faces additional costs 
when using dominant payment methods, such as credit cards. Especially in times of low in-
terest rates, banks and other intermediaries tend to charge their customers even more in 
fees (Kashian & Drago, 2016). Due to the ability of cryptocurrencies to eliminate interme-
diaries, they reduce transaction costs. This leads to a great impact particularly on interna-
tional money transactions, which are usually loaded with transaction fees (Beck, Avital, 
Rossi, & Thatcher, 2017). Consequently, the initial performance of cryptocurrencies re-
garding cost is at least as strong, if not stronger, than the currently dominating payment 
methods. 
Convenience: The convenience of a payment method could potentially interfere with its se-
curity. The less data and information are needed for a payment, the more convenient it is, 
but the higher the chances of fraud become as well. Cryptocurrencies, especially when con-
nected to Smart Contracts, could potentially contradict the above-mentioned correlation. 
As aforementioned, Smart Contracts are self-executing contracts, which allow a transaction 
to be executed automatically only if pre-determined transaction rules are met by all partici-
pants in a transaction (Voshmgir, 2016). If this can be accomplished, the performance of 
cryptocurrencies in terms of convenience could be considered at least as high as the con-
venience of other payment methods. However, the increased convenience for the user still 
results in a small transaction fee, to compensate the miner for the laborious PoW process. 
Neither cost, nor convenience of cryptocurrencies fulfill the Initial Performance character-
istic of a disruption process as the performance in these areas is not necessarily weaker 
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than the performance of the currently dominating payment methods. In terms of security, 
however, it could be argued that cryptocurrencies underperform compared to the prevailing 
payment methods. This is not because of its underlying technology, but because of its lack 
of regulation and laws. Due to this underperformance, the Initial Performance characteris-
tic could be considered fulfilled. 
4.3.2.2 Product Feature 
Second, disruptions are also characterized by a new Product Feature that only a few cus-
tomers in niche segments value or consider beneficial (Tellis, 2006). As mentioned in the 
previous section, cryptocurrencies could be considered less secure compared to other pay-
ment methods due to their lack of regulations. Because of regulations and laws for domi-
nant payment methods, the mainstream customers liability is limited even in cases of fraud. 
However, the absence of official regulations for cryptocurrencies and the anonymity result-
ing from the decentralization of the underlying blockchain technology, are features that 
make them attractive for some people and certain types of payments (Quora, 2018). This, 
in addition to reduced transaction cost, is particularly useful for fast, worldwide, cross-bor-
der transactions (Chan, Chu, Nadarajah, & Osterrieder., 2017). With only 13% of online 
shopping in the US and only 18% in Europe being cross-border, international payments 
could be considered a niche (Tamturk, 2017). Therefore, the second of the five criteria for 
a disruptive innovation would be fulfilled. 
4.3.2.3 Market Entry 
Third, the Market Entry of an innovation needs to be looked at in order to determine 
whether cryptocurrencies are disruptive or not. According to Tellis (2006), an innovation 
can be considered disruptive if it enters the market through an emerging or insignificant 
market segment because it is not valued by the most profitable customers of incumbents. 
Therefore, these leading companies conclude that it is not worth investing in the innova-
tion. 
Whether cryptocurrencies match this criterion is difficult to determine, partly because the 
definition of the criterion is ambiguous. As outlined in the previous section, cryptocurren-
cies are currently more beneficial for niche markets, especially for cross-border transac-
tions. This is also underlined by the fact that cryptocurrencies have been used by less than 
two percent of online shoppers (CIGI, n.d.). Therefore, the first part of the criterion’s defi-
nition could be considered fulfilled. However, the second part of it, with the incumbents 
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ignoring the innovation, is not fulfilled since leading companies have invested millions of 
dollars into R&D of the technology (Tama, Kweka, Park, & Rhee, 2017). Additionally, it 
is widely believed that the blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies will have a tremen-
dous impact on the financial services industry, which is why the technology is far from be-
ing ignored or underestimated. Besides the high investments in the technology, the poten-
tial relevance of cryptocurrencies is also indicated by the fact that Bitcoin derivatives can 
be traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) since 2018.  
Since the first part of the criterion is met, it could be argued that cryptocurrencies partially 
fulfill the Market Entry criterion. However, the R&D investments and the awareness of the 
impact cryptocurrencies could have rather suggest that they are not ignored by incumbents. 
Based on this, the third criterion of a disruptive innovation is not fulfilled. 
4.3.2.4 Development of Performance 
The fourth characteristic of a disruption process considers the Product Performance of an 
innovation. While it initially underperforms compared to the dominant products in some 
dimensions that have been of value for mainstream customers, it steadily improves its per-
formance until the performance meets the demands in the mainstream market. By the be-
ginning of 2019, it is not possible to tell whether this will be the case. Undoubtedly, the 
performance of cryptocurrencies has been improving and will do so in the future, espe-
cially with the use of Smart Contracts. However, it remains to be seen whether it will be 
enough to meet the demands of the mainstream customers. Therefore, it is not yet possible 
to determine if the fourth characteristic is fulfilled. 
4.3.2.5 Displacement of Dominant Incumbents 
Similarly to the fourth characteristic of disruptive innovation, the fifth, which is the Dis-
placement of Dominant Incumbents, cannot be determined as fulfilled or unfulfilled at this 
point. Research shows that providers of dominant payment methods such as banks and 
credit card providers, including Mastercard and Visa, have been under pressure (“Impact of 
PayPal, Google, Amazon & Emerging Payment Providers on Visa, MasterCard & Pay-
ments Industry”, 2010). However, this pressure mainly originates from other payment pro-
viders such as PayPal. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether cryptocurrencies will be 
able to displace dominant incumbents. Until then, it is not possible to tell if the fifth char-
acteristic of disruptive innovation is fulfilled. 
 25 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
What has been criticized about Christensen’s theory is that it is difficult to use for ex-ante 
predictions (Danneels, 2004). The analysis whether cryptocurrencies can be considered a 
disruptive innovation serves as an example for this. Although more than ten years have 
passed since the introduction of the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, it is not possible to tell if all 
the criteria that define a disruptive innovation are fulfilled. Especially for the Performance 
Development and the Displacement of Dominant Incumbents characteristics, it is only pos-
sible to speculate what will happen. 
Even without considering the fourth and fifth criteria, cryptocurrencies may not be consid-
ered disruptive. While the Initial Performance and the Product Feature characteristics 
could be considered fulfilled, the Market Entry characteristic is not met. Unlike the crite-
rion requires, cryptocurrencies are neither ignored nor underestimated by incumbents, 
which can be seen by the investments in the technology of such firms. However, just be-
cause cryptocurrencies may not be considered a disruptive innovation, their impact has 
been and will be immense. The reduced cost due the absence of intermediaries, the use of 
Smart Contracts, and the anonymity the technology provides will contribute to this. Addi-
tionally, on-going globalization would lead to an increase in cross-border transactions 
which promote the use of cryptocurrencies even further (Tamturk, 2017). 
To conclude, it can be stated that the impact cryptocurrencies have will be enormous, but 
not disruptive as the table below indicates. However, more time is needed to determine the 
exact impact this application of the blockchain technology will have. 
Characteristic Fulfillment 
1. Initial Performance 
 
2. Product Feature 
 
3. Market Entry 
 
4. Performance Development 
 
5. Displacement of Dominant 
Incumbents 
 
Table 4. Results of Analysis of Cryptocurrencies 
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5 Disruptive Impact of Blockchain as an Intermediary 
5.1 General Overview on Intermediaries 
The term intermediary has its origins in the 18th century and derives from the French word 
“intermédiaire” (“Intermediary”, n.d.). It describes a person or organization that acts as a 
link, “third party”, between a minimum of two parties in order to bring about an agree-
ment. The existence of intermediaries and their benefits are dealt with in an area referred to 
as intermediation theory. The key findings of this theory relate to asymmetric information 
and transaction cost (Allen & Santomero, 1997). According to Diamond (1984) intermedi-
aries have the ability to overcome asymmetric information by acting as delegated monitors.  
Intermediaries are used in any field or industry where transactions are of importance. They 
can include: intermediaries for C2C transactions, like AirBnB; intermediaries for B2C 
transactions, like electricity and energy providers; and B2B transactions, for example in the 
supply chain of manufacturers (Yoo, Choudhary, & Mukhopadhyay, 2002). Unfortunately, 
because of the enormous influence many intermediaries have gained, they have become an 
increasing part of bribery schemes which impacted the reliability of certain intermediaries 
(Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Clearinghouse, n.d.). However, reliability is a crucial char-
acteristic for an intermediary, as many customers and businesses rely on their mediation in 
connecting activities.  
For these reasons, Transaction Cost, Asymmetric Information, and Reliability, were se-
lected as the three criteria valued by the mainstream market to be considered in the analy-
sis. The table below provides an overview of the three dimensions: 
 
 
 
Factor Explanation 
Transaction Cost Initially, one of the main benefits of intermediaries was 
their ability to share fixed costs which reduced the overall 
transaction costs (Allen & Santomero, 1997). However, it is 
possible that using intermediaries is more expensive for 
customers due to the fees intermediaries charge (Diamond, 
1984). 
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Asymmetric Information Another great benefit of using intermediaries is their ability 
to overcome asymmetric information. Being a delegated 
monitor, they have a better knowledge of all participating 
parties in a transaction (Diamond, 1984). 
Reliability As the number of intermediaries increases, more and more 
customers and businesses depend on them (Edelman, 
2014). Therefore, it is crucial for intermediaries to act as 
neutral, reliable, and trusted third parties.  
Table 5. Factors Impacting Intermediaries 
5.2 The Influence Blockchain has as an Intermediary 
Due to the nature of the technology, blockchain has a great potential to replace many inter-
mediaries (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). While intermediaries are generally considered to be 
useful third-party institutions, there are certain issues. To begin with, most of the criticism 
about intermediaries derives from their way of operating centrally. Because of this, the 
servers they use are vulnerable to hacks, fraud, and crashes. Moreover, this allows interme-
diaries to operate with little transparency and to collect customers data for their own uses. 
As aforementioned, intermediaries are useful to reduce transaction cost (Allen & Santom-
ero, 1997). However, it is possible that due to charges, the use of intermediaries is still rel-
atively expensive (Diamond, 1984). 
With its ability to replace intermediaries, the blockchain technology could be the solution 
to some of these problems (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). As the DLT runs on computers 
provided by volunteers all over the world in the P2P network and uses encryption, it makes 
hacking and fraud almost impossible. Moreover, public blockchains are extremely trans-
parent, which resolves another problem with intermediaries. Finally, with the verification 
through the P2P network instead of a central institution, transaction costs are further re-
duced as very few charges occur for the verification, which are usually paid for directly by 
the user who makes a transaction on the network. However, there is also literature that sug-
gests intermediaries will not become obsolete because of blockchain, but rather that they 
will play a different role (Catalini & Gans, 2016). For Example, instead of having access to 
all transactions, an intermediary might only gain access to individual transactions if a prob-
lem occurs.  
5.3 Example of Application: Microgrids 
In order to analyze whether the blockchain technology poses a disruptive threat for inter-
mediaries, the five characteristics of disruption serve as a framework again. This section 
uses microgrids in the energy market as an example. Consequently, the analysis does not 
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allow general judgement about what impact blockchain might have when applied as an in-
termediary in the financial industry. Some similarities do exist, though.   
5.3.1 Introduction 
Microgrids are locally restricted energy networks that coordinate supply and demand of 
electricity (Lo Prete & Hobbs, 2016). They consist of multiple distributed generation units 
and loads which operate as a coordinated system. While a microgrid could sustain itself, in 
most cases, it is still connected to the main electricity grid. A microgrid could be a housing 
community or a neighborhood in which inhabitants use solar panels to generate renewable 
energy. Being part of the same microgrid, the inhabitants can trade electricity amongst 
each other. This way, so called prosumers - people that produce and consume a product, 
gain access to the electricity market (Green & Newman, 2017). Ideally, the peers trade en-
ergy directly with each other without intermediation by conventional energy suppliers 
(Zhang, Wu, Zhou, Cheng, & Long, 2018). 
 
Figure 6. Schematic Display of Microgrid (Own Figure) 
One benefit of a well-functioning microgrid is the reduction of energy cost and it addition-
ally serves as an incentive for further investment in renewable energy sources (Coelho, 
Weiss Cohen, Coelho, Liu, & Gadelha Guimarães, 2017). Moreover, it leads to a decentral-
ized infrastructure and it facilitates maintenance. All of these factors increase the mi-
crogrid’s independence from the main electricity grid while it provides market access for 
prosumers at the same time. 
If microgrids, and electricity grids in general, include operational and energy measures 
such as smart meters and smart appliances, the grid is referred to as a smart grid (Farhangi, 
2010). It provides two-way communication, as consumers are empowered to interact with 
the energy management system. Moreover, information technology (IT) plays a crucial role 
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in a smart grid, as it balances supply and demand while minimizing operational and 
maintenance costs. 
With its decentralized consensus mechanism in a P2P network, the blockchain technology 
is believed to play a crucial role in microgrids, potentially making intermediation by con-
ventional energy suppliers obsolete (Green & Newman, 2017). Some models suggest a P2P 
microgrid, which enables prosumers to trade energy locally with each other via a smart 
management system (Sabounchi & Wei, 2017). In these models, transactions are executed 
in a decentralized manner by leveraging blockchain technologies. Thus, Smart Contracts 
and verification in the P2P network are incorporated to build trust in the network and to en-
able prosumers in the microgrid to buy and sell energy in a real-time, auction-based man-
ner. Depending on the desired degree of transparency by the peers, a public or a private 
blockchain solution can be employed (Pop et al., 2018; Aitzhan & Svetinovic, 2018). 
Numerous startups and other initiatives have been working on blockchain solutions for mi-
crogrids, some of which have been implemented already (BDEW, 2017). For example, the 
US startup Lo3 Energy has created a permissioned data platform that creates localized en-
ergy marketplaces for transacting energy across existing grid infrastructure (“Reshaping 
the Energy Future”, 2018). Using the blockchain technology, Lo3 Energy created the 
“Brooklyn Network”, the first P2P energy trading solution for prosumers in history, by 
connecting neighboring residents. The success of this and many other projects, as well as 
the increasing necessity for renewable energy resources indicate the high potential of the 
blockchain technology being used as an intermediary in this area (BDEW, 2017). There-
fore, the following section analyzes whether the tremendous impact of the technology 
could be disruptive. 
5.3.2 Is Blockchain Potentially Disruptive for Electricity Grids? 
5.3.2.1 Initial Performance 
In order to be considered a disruptive innovation, the Initial Performance of a product or 
service must be weaker in a dimension that has been valued historically by the mainstream 
market (Tellis, 2006). In the previous sections, Low Transaction Cost, the overcoming of 
Asymmetric Information, and Reliability were identified as three dimensions which are 
considered crucial for intermediaries.  
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Low Transaction Cost: The use of blockchain in microgrids reduces transaction costs even 
further (Mylrea & Gourisetti, 2017). Instead of paying high charges to a central third-party 
intermediary for executing trades, the P2P validation by the network members does not 
create additional cost, other than a small charge directly associated with the validation. 
Moreover, the use of Smart Contracts increases the trust and allows the system to execute 
transactions automatically if the predetermined conditions in the contract are met. As the 
transaction costs with blockchain as an intermediary in microgrids are lower, the initial 
performance of the technology is stronger compared to third-party intermediaries. 
Asymmetric Information: As aforementioned, the blockchain technology is extremely 
transparent. Even if a private instead of a public blockchain is used, the prosumers in a mi-
crogrid do not have to fear asymmetric information. Smart Contracts ensure that transac-
tion partners fulfill all predetermined and relevant conditions. Therefore, the initial perfor-
mance of a blockchain solution is at least as strong as the performance of third-party inter-
mediaries. Moreover, it could even be argued that it is better, as blockchain is much more 
transparent. 
Reliability: In terms of the initial performance regarding reliability, arguments for both a 
weaker as well as a stronger performance of blockchain solutions compared to third-party 
intermediaries can be found. When considering data security and protection from fraud, the 
blockchain solution outperforms third-party intermediaries due to its higher transparency. 
In terms of providing electricity, the decentral mode of operating via a blockchain mi-
crogrid is often considered an advantage (Coelho et al., 2017). However, at times it might 
be possible that the demand in a microgrid is higher than the supply. In these cases, a solu-
tion with intermediation by a conventional energy supplier outperforms the blockchain so-
lution, as it can meet the demand by simply providing electricity from the main grid. Con-
sequently, it could be argued either way regarding the reliability. However, the fact that 
most microgrids are still connected to the main grid, despite the local P2P trade, could be 
considered as an indicator that, in terms of reliability, blockchain solutions perform slightly 
weaker than solutions with conventional energy providers as an intermediary. 
Neither the Low Transaction Cost, nor the Asymmetric Information criterion fulfill what 
the first characteristic of disruption demands. Regarding the Reliability criterion, it was 
hard to determine whether the initial performance is weaker or stronger. However, it is rea-
sonable to assumed that blockchain solutions could be considered slightly less reliable 
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since most microgrids are still connected to the main grid. Therefore, the first characteristic 
of a disruptive innovation is fulfilled. 
5.3.2.2 Product Feature 
To meet the second characteristic of a disruptive innovation, the product or service consid-
ered must provide a new Product Feature, which is not valued by the mainstream custom-
ers but only by a niche market (Tellis, 2006). Assuming the mainstream market in this case 
to be everyone who is supplied by the main electricity grid and everyone who is part of a 
microgrid with intermediation by a conventional energy supplier, it is difficult to find such 
a product feature. This derives from the fact that all product features the blockchain solu-
tion brings along, seem to be desired by the mainstream market and not just by a niche.9 
Therefore, the second of the five characteristics is not fulfilled. 
5.3.2.3 Market Entry 
A product or service fulfills the third characteristic of disruption, if it entered the market 
via an emerging or insignificant market. For blockchain solutions in a microgrid electricity 
market this applies, since the technology was first implemented in microgrids with prosum-
ers. Intermediation by blockchain is most beneficial in a community where people generate 
their own electricity and trade it amongst each other. As less than 20% of all houseowners 
in Germany have installed solar panels and less than 7% of electricity in Germany is gener-
ated using solar panels, this can be considered an emerging market, especially since the 
number of prosumers tends to be even lower in other countries (AGEB, n.d.). Conse-
quently, this characteristic is fulfilled. 
5.3.2.4 Development of Performance 
As indicated in previous sections, the only dimension that has been historically valued by 
mainstream customers and in which a blockchain solution underperforms was Reliability. 
Therefore, the Performance Development in this dimension must be regarded to analyze 
the fourth characteristic. Undoubtedly, the performance of blockchain solutions in a mi-
crogrid energy market will increase further. However, as the solution only aims at taking 
over intermediating tasks, it will never be able to provide electricity from the main grid in a 
way an intermediating conventional energy supplier can. Consequently, local blockchain 
                                                 
 
9 As it is impossible to prove for sure that something does not exist, it is possible that there is a product fea-
ture only desired by a niche the author is not aware of. 
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solutions will always be slightly less reliable in situations where a microgrid is not self-
sustaining. Therefore, the characteristic is not fulfilled. 
5.3.2.5 Displacement of Dominant Incumbents 
As indicated in the previous section, it is very unlikely that incumbents will be completely 
displaced. Much more likely, and this is also what the literature suggests, their role will 
change, and their influence could decrease (Farhangi, 2010). Over time, the electricity grid 
could become increasingly decentralized because of the benefits blockchain provides as an 
intermediary in microgrids. Nevertheless, conventional energy suppliers will still play a 
significant role if the demand does not match the supply in microgrids. It is not yet possible 
to tell for sure whether incumbents will not be displaced, but as there are clear indicators 
that they will not, the fifth characteristic is not considered fulfilled.  
5.3.3 Conclusion 
With its decentralized consensus mechanism and its P2P validation, the blockchain tech-
nology is ideal for fulfilling intermediating tasks. Especially if the technology is connected 
to Smart Contracts, it serves and will serve as a useful intermediary in many fields and in-
dustries where transactions occur frequently. In microgrids too, blockchain-based interme-
diaries will have a big impact and will contribute to the decentralization of the electricity 
grid. 
However, the impact the technology has as an intermediary will most likely not be disrup-
tive. The literature agrees that as an intermediary, blockchain will most likely follow evo-
lutionary trajectories instead of being the trigger for a drastic overhaul (Farhangi, 2010). In 
general, it is commonly believed that blockchain will not make intermediaries obsolete and 
displace them, but rather change their roles. This could derive from the fact that most of to-
day’s third-party intermediaries perform not only intermediating tasks but have a greater 
interest in the transactions themselves. In many microgrids, for example, conventional en-
ergy providers are executing the intermediating task between the prosumers, but they also 
supply the participants with electricity if the demand exceeds the supply. This is also part 
of the reason why the fourth and fifth characteristic are not fulfilled in the microgrid exam-
ple. Neither was the second characteristic fulfilled, as there were no identified features val-
ued by a niche and not the mainstream market. Regarding the initial performance, block-
chain solutions fulfill this characteristic, as they are considered slightly less reliable than 
intermediating conventional energy suppliers. Additionally, the market entry characteristic 
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is fulfilled, since prosumers of electricity are members of an emerging market. Overall, the 
potential of blockchain as an intermediary is immense. However, in the energy market, the 
technology will probably not be disruptive. 
Characteristic Fulfillment 
1. Initial Performance 
 
2. Product Feature 
 
3. Market Entry 
 
4. Performance Development 
 
5. Displacement of Dominant 
Incumbents 
 
Table 6. Results of Analysis of Blockchain in Microgrids 
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6 Disruptive Impact of Blockchain on Data Transfer and Storage 
6.1 General Overview on Data Transfer and Storage 
In May 2017, the Economist claimed that “The world’s most valuable resource is no longer 
oil, but data” (2017). While only 0.1 zettabytes of data were created worldwide in 2005, 
the amount has increased drastically since then and is expected to reach 47 zettabytes in 
2020 and 163 zettabytes in 2025 (Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers, n.d.). Moreover, the 
importance of data is indicated by the impact the Big Data industry has had in recent years 
(SiliconANGLE, n.d.). However, industries have realized that by saving as much data as 
possible, they face storage restrictions sooner rather than later (Hashem et al., 2015). 
Therefore, capacity is a crucial factor to consider when analyzing solutions for storing and 
transferring data. 
Another very important dimension, if not the most important, when storing and transferring 
data is protecting privacy (FCCCO, 2018). After severe breaches of data security in the 
past, companies have invested billions of dollars in protecting their clients’ data (Kahn, 
Bodoni, & Nicola, 2018). Failure of this could be extremely costly for companies, as laws 
are in place now to punish security breaches in data management. According to the Euro-
pean Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), fines for companies can be as 
high as 4% of their annual revenue. Therefore, privacy protection is of tremendous im-
portance for both providers and users of data management solutions. 
Finally, accessibility is a third important dimension in data transfer and storage (Chen, 
Mao, & Lie, 2014). This includes, among other factors, user-friendliness and the speed of 
transactions. This is because the best protected and most capable data storage solution will 
be useless if the interface is poor or transaction speed is low because of laborious valida-
tion processes. Thus, the accessibility determines how fast data can be accessed and ana-
lyzed and is therefore of utmost importance. 
For the abovementioned reasons, Capacity, Privacy Protection, and Accessibility were se-
lected as three dimensions for the analysis: 
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Factor Explanation 
Capacity This dimension considers the amount of data that can be 
stored or transferred by a solution. It has become increas-
ingly important as storage restrictions limit the impact Big 
Data and Data Management can have (Hashem et al., 
2015). 
Privacy Protection This dimension is not just crucial for the trust customers 
have in a company, it could also have a tremendous impact 
on a company’s financial well-being as fines for data leaks 
are considerable (Kahn et al., 2018). 
Accessibility The third dimension is primarily concerned with transac-
tion speed and user-friendliness as these factors determine 
the convenience of data analysis (Chen et al., 2014). 
Table 7. Factors Impacting Data Transfer and Storage 
6.2 The Influence Blockchain has on Data Transfer and Storage 
As emphasized earlier in this paper, blockchain technology is of great use for transaction-
based applications. Since data management largely depends on transactions, the impact 
blockchain will have is quite considerable. However, it is worth noting that the technology 
was originally not designed to store digital documents (Vo, Kundu, & Mohania, 2018). 
This derives from the relatively large size of digital documents and the fact that the size of 
a blockchain increases permanently as old transactions are saved while new ones are 
added. This results in several constraints of the blockchain for data management, such as 
storage size, bandwidth and transaction throughput. A possible solution to these constraints 
is to use blockchain-based platforms for data-verification and transactions but connect the 
platforms to offline storage where the data, including a digital hash, is stored. 
As introduced third chapter, there are three different types of blockchains, depending on 
the writing and reading rights (Zheng et al.,2018). Due to the importance of privacy in data 
management, public blockchains are barely used. Instead private, and, even more, consor-
tium blockchains provide many benefits for this sort of application (Vo et al., 2018). Using 
a platform that is based on consortium blockchains, every user can determine which other 
institutions or people gain access to the data (Zyskind & Nathan, 2015). This way, data 
management becomes much more decentralized but efficient at the same time, as only rele-
vant people or institutions get access to the data. Because of these benefits, blockchain ap-
plications in data management are believed to be a possible solution for trusted computing 
problems in society. 
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Since data is becoming increasingly important in any industry and field, blockchain-based 
platform solutions have a tremendous potential (Katal, Wazid, & Goudar, 2013). The fol-
lowing section discusses whether the impact of blockchain on data transfer and storage is 
disruptive or not. Therefore, the data management of health records is regarded, as this 
field appears to be particularly impacted and some blockchain-based platforms have al-
ready been implemented (FCCCC, 2018). 
6.3 Example: Medical Records 
Using the five characteristics of disruption for assessing a blockchain-based health record 
management, this section aims to give a general recommendation on whether blockchain is 
potentially disruptive for data transfer and storage or not. So far, blockchain-based data 
transfer and storage systems have barely been implemented on a large scale in a field other 
than medical records which is why this particular field has been chosen for the analysis. 
However, due to certain similarities between the nature of the financial services industry 
and the healthcare industry, conclusions from the analysis of the technology in medical 
records might also be applicable for the financial services industry. Of the two industries, 
the healthcare industry was usually the one to learn from transformations in the financial 
services industry (Yamaguchi, 2016). With blockchain-based data storage and transfer, 
however, it might be just vice versa, given the progress that has been made in the imple-
mentation of such solutions for medical records.  
6.3.1 Introduction of Application 
Blockchain is widely believed to solve some of the biggest challenges in the field of 
healthcare (FCCCO, 2018). While the technology is likely to impact processes to acceler-
ate R&D and to improve care delivery and management, it has had and will continue to 
have a tremendous impact on the management of health records. This has its origins in the 
fragility of many western health care systems, where electronic health records (EHR) are 
barely adopted (Tang, Ash, Bates, Overhage, & Sands, 2006). Instead, many institutions 
store their files with patient data locally, which results in slow processes and redundant ex-
aminations. Consequently, doctors, hospitals, and even governments have their own, inde-
pendent solution for storing their patients’ data. Additionally, and this also holds for some 
EHRs, the patients themselves have little to no influence on what happens with their data. 
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The establishment of blockchain-based platforms could permit all parties in the healthcare 
value chain to have access to patient information (FCCCO, 2018). The underlying DLT en-
sures the security and integrity of data and, by adjusting reading and writing rights of the 
chain, a patient could control who accesses their information. Estonia has been among the 
first countries to implement the blockchain technology in their healthcare system. With the 
project “e-estonia”, the country has been able to digitize 95% of health data (e-Health Rec-
ords, n.d.). Additionally, 100% of billing in healthcare is electronic and 99% of prescrip-
tions are digital. This solution, provided by Guardtime, records patient data in an e-health 
record on a blockchain-based platform. There, it can be conveniently accessed and audited 
by different stakeholders, including the patients themselves. In an emergency, for example, 
doctors in hospitals can quickly access a patient’s data, including image files, such as x-
rays, from remote hospitals. 
The interest in blockchain-based solutions in healthcare is immense, which is why it has 
gained the attention of numerous startups and initiatives and the impact of these solutions 
is considered revolutionary (FCCCO, 2018). 
6.3.2 Is Blockchain Potentially Disruptive for Medical Records? 
6.3.2.1 Initial Performance 
The degree to which blockchain solutions under- or overperform conventional alternatives 
regarding Capacity, Privacy Protection, and Accessibility is evaluated in the following to 
find out whether blockchain-based health records qualify as disruptive: 
Capacity: As outlined in section 6.2, the blockchain was not initially designed to store and 
transfer documents or files (Vo et al., 2018). Hence, the data might need to be stored out-
side the actual blockchain. Nevertheless, as the success of the Estonian health record sys-
tem indicates, a blockchain-based platform can still outperform files stored offline by doc-
tors and hospitals individually (Mettler, 2016). However, compared to other EHRs, which 
are becoming increasingly popular, the blockchain technology likely underperforms re-
garding the amount of data that can be stored or transferred (Tang et al., 2006; Vo et al., 
2018). 
Privacy Protection: It could be argued that by digitizing health records and by storing them 
on a device with internet access, the security is reduced (Grobauer, Walloschek, & Stocker, 
2011). However, this does not imply that hardcopies or offline stored health records are 
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necessarily safer. These files might not be as vulnerable to large scale fraud as files stored 
online, but abuse can still occur. At least, the blockchain technology increases the security 
of health records compared to other EHR solutions (FCCCO, 2018). Additionally, as 
blockchain-based platforms increase transparency by allowing the patient to partially ad-
just the reading and writing rights of the data, these platforms outperform conventional 
health records. 
Accessibility: Blockchain-based health record platforms clearly outperform health records 
that every doctor or institution creates and stores individually, since these conventional 
health records are barely shared. Compared to other EHR solutions, the accessibility does 
not depend on the underlying technology as much as it does on the interface and user 
friendliness of the application, as well as on the degree of implementation. However, the 
success of the Estonian health record solution indicates that a blockchain-based solution 
can be at least as accessible as any other EHR solution (Mettler, 2016). 
Blockchain-based platforms seem to outperform conventional alternatives in terms of Pri-
vacy Protection and Accessibility and therefore do not fulfill the first disruption character-
istic. However, regarding Capacity, it can be argued that DLT solutions underperform con-
ventional methods, as the mechanics of the blockchain technology are not ideal for storing 
and transferring documents and files. Consequently, the first characteristic of disruption is 
fulfilled. 
6.3.2.2 Product Feature 
While health records traditionally have had the purpose to inform doctors about the state of 
a patient and results from previous examinations, so called personal health records (PHR) 
are more patient centered (Archer, Fevrier-Thomas, Lokker, McKibbon, & Straus, 2011). 
These records aim at making health related information available to patients, thus assisting 
patients in health-self management. Blockchain-based health record platforms are ideal for 
PHRs, as they provide features that not only allow patients to view their records but also 
allow them to partially determine who else has access to these records. For example, it 
could be beneficial if a patient permits close relatives’ access to his or her health record as 
well. 
However, PHRs are not yet very common (Tang et al., 2006). Therefore, it can be argued 
that the product features of blockchain-based platforms, which enable patients or relatives 
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to access their health records, are only useful for a few consumers. Hence, the second cha-
racteristic of disruption is also fulfilled. 
6.3.2.3 Market Entry 
It is rather difficult to determine whether the market entry characteristic is fulfilled or not 
due to the segmentation of the target market. Implementing a blockchain-based platform 
only increases efficiency and is beneficial if most people in a country participate and if the 
platform is used as the exclusive solution for storing and transferring a patient’s health re-
lated data. Hence, the entire population of a country needs to be considered a market. How-
ever, this one market can barely be considered small or emerging like the disruption char-
acteristic requires. Nevertheless, it may be argued that a blockchain-based platform was 
first implemented in Estonia, which is a relatively small market if the size of the population 
is considered. As equally strong arguments for and against the fulfillment of the third char-
acteristic can be found, no ultimate decision can be made. 
6.3.2.4 Development of Performance 
To analyze the performance development characteristic, the performance of blockchain-
based health records in the Capacity dimension needs to be considered. To fulfill the char-
acteristic, the initial underperformance of blockchain platforms in this dimension needs to 
be overcome to meet the demands of mainstream customers. Since a lot of R&D is in-
vested in this area, the amount of data blockchain is capable of storing or transferring is 
likely to increase. However, at this point, it is not possible to tell if the demands of the 
mainstream market can be met. While the success in the Estonian system suggests that 
these demands can be met on a small scale, it is not yet possible to consider this character-
istic fulfilled.  
6.3.2.5 Displacement of Dominant Incumbents 
Since a successful EHR management system requires most people of a country to partici-
pate, all other alternatives could be displaced in that country. Therefore, if a country de-
cides for a blockchain-based data management solution for its health records and, if the 
system succeeds, the fifth characteristic of disruption would be fulfilled. However, it is still 
a long way to go, which is why, at this point, it is not possible to determine if this charac-
teristic will be met. 
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6.3.3 Conclusion 
More and more people and institutions have become aware of the benefits of EHRs and 
even PHRs which is why they have become increasingly popular (Tang et al., 2006). With 
its DLT, blockchain seems to be almost ideal as the underlying technology for data man-
agement systems. Only its limited capacity for storing and transferring data and some re-
maining and justified skepticism concerning the security of storing data online could set a 
limit to the use of blockchain for data management.  
The first characteristic of disruption is fulfilled by blockchain’s limited capacity for storing 
and transferring data, as this is the reason for the underperformance of the technology in a 
dimension historically valued by the mainstream market. In the other two dimensions that 
were analyzed, namely Privacy Protection and Accessibility, the DLT provided at least the 
same level of performance as conventional health records. The second characteristic of dis-
ruption is fulfilled by the technology’s ability to allow patients to view their records them-
selves and to partially control the reading and writing rights, as this feature seems to be 
particularly valued by a small segment of PHR users. Regarding the third characteristic, the 
Market Entry, it could be argued for or against indicators of disruption, depending on the 
segmentation of the market. If Estonia is considered a small segment of a market, the third 
characteristic is fulfilled. At this point, it is not possible to determine whether the Perfor-
mance Improvement and the Displacement of Incumbents criteria are fulfilled. However, 
there are indicators that these characteristics will be met in the future if blockchain-based 
platforms turn out to be the preferred solution for health record management. In that case, 
it will be possible to blockchain is a disruption for health record management. 
Characteristic Fulfillment 
1. Initial Performance 
 
2. Product Feature 
 
3. Market Entry 
 
4. Performance Development 
 
5. Displacement of Dominant 
Incumbents 
 
Table 8. Results of Analysis of Blockchain for Health Records 
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7 General Evaluation of Results 
Undoubtedly, the blockchain technology has had a significant influence on many indus-
tries, and most authors agree that this influence will increase even further in the future. 
Thus, the previous chapters assessed whether the increasing influence of the technology 
shows indicators elements of disruption. Therefore, we analyzed if the five characteristics 
of disruption are fulfilled by three major applications of the DLT. 
First, the possible disruptive impact of cryptocurrencies on payment methods was tested. 
To analyze the fulfillment of the Initial Performance characteristic, security, cost, and con-
venience were used as the dimensions historically valued by mainstream customers. The 
analysis of cryptocurrencies indicated that the Initial Performance as well as the Product 
Feature criteria are fulfilled, while the Market Entry criterion is not. The latter derives 
from the fact that cryptocurrencies are not ignored by the industry’s incumbents. Yet, it is 
not possible to determine whether the Performance Development and the Displacement of 
Incumbents characteristics will be fulfilled. Certainly, cryptocurrencies will have a tremen-
dous impact on payment methods but based on the analysis, it is rather unlikely that this 
impact will be disruptive. 
Second, the use of blockchain as an intermediary was analyzed. The dimensions that were 
used for the analysis are low transaction cost, asymmetric information, and reliability. It 
was revealed that only the Initial Performance and the Market Entry criteria were met, 
which is why there are not many indicators of a disruption process for this application. The 
example of microgrids indicates that one reason for this is that most intermediaries seem to 
have more functions than the actual intermediating. In most cases, this makes a replace-
ment of incumbents unlikely. 
And third, we analyzed if blockchain has the potential to disrupt data storage and data 
transfer. Of the three applications tested, this is the only one in which, according to the 
analysis, blockchain could be disruptive, indeed. The Initial Performance and the Product 
Feature characteristics are clearly met. For the former, capacity, privacy protection, and 
accessibility were used as the three dimensions historically valued. For the Market Entry 
characteristic, arguments can be found for and against the fulfillment. It is not yet possible 
to tell whether the Performance Development and the Incumbent Displacement characteris-
tics will be met. However, this leaves a chance for blockchain to be disruptive for data 
storage and transfer in the future. 
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The table below presents an overview over the three applications of the blockchain tech-
nology and their fulfillment of the five characteristics of disruption. The table reveals how 
the Initial Performance is never the cause for blockchain not being disruptive, as the DLT 
underperforms in at least one of the dimensions which are valued by the mainstream mar-
ket. Moreover, the table suggests that there does not seem to be a general pattern for the 
Product Feature and Market Entry characteristics for blockchain applications that indicate 
disruption. Regarding the fourth and fifth characteristics, the analysis supports one aspect 
that has been criticized about Christensen’s theory. Although Christensen mentions in the 
beginning of his The Innovator’s Dilemma how his work could be used by managers to 
recognize if their industry is disrupted, many authors claimed that the theory is not very 
useful for making ex-ante predictions. Especially the analysis for payment methods and 
data management indicates that it is almost impossible to tell, at this point, whether block-
chain indicates disruption. 
Characteristic Payment Methods Intermediary Data Manage-ment 
1. Initial Performance 
   
2. Product Feature 
   
3. Market Entry 
   
4. Performance Develop-
ment 
   
5. Displacement of Domi-
nant Incumbents 
 
  
Table 9. Results of Analysis 
While this might be a problem for the academic theory, it is of little importance in the real-
world. No matter whether an innovation is considered disruptive or not, if it has a signifi-
cant impact on an industry, it requires immediate attention. Blockchain proves just that: 
Although it is unlikely to turn out to be disruptive for payment methods and as an interme-
diary, blockchain could play a key role in these fields. Therefore, the technology could be a 
potential risk for companies not taking it seriously, but it also creates many opportunities if 
it is given proper attention. However, coming back to the initial question, the analysis also 
indicates that blockchain also has the potential to become disruptive according to Christen-
sen’s theory. While it is not possible to ultimately predict that it will be disruptive, there 
are definitely indicators in the field of data management that it could be. 
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8 Conclusion 
The goal of this paper was to answer the question whether blockchain has the potential to 
become a disruption according to Clayton Christensen’s disruption theory. Therefore, the 
theory and the five characteristics that define the process of disruption were outlined in the 
first part of the paper. That and the following explanation of the blockchain technology 
served as the basis for the analysis and evaluation in chapters four to seven. For the analy-
sis, three applications of the DLT, namely payment methods, intermediaries, as well as 
data storage and transfer, were considered. The fulfillment of the five characteristics of dis-
ruption was assessed using an example for each of the three applications. 
While the results of the analysis provide a general idea about the indicators of disruption 
for three applications of blockchain, they are not fully representative. Hence, even if the 
example of microgrids suggests that blockchain will probably not be disruptive for inter-
mediaries, there is a fair chance that it could be in fields other than electricity. Moreover, to 
answer the question concerning whether the DLT will be disruptive, only three major fields 
of application were considered. However, the technology also has other forms of applica-
tion, which might or might not reveal indicators of disruption. Another possible source of 
error is the assumption that characteristics of disruption are not fulfilled, as it is not possi-
ble to ultimately prove that something does not exist. Moreover, there is a chance that 
some of the sources are biased towards or against blockchain. 
Additionally, the paper might serve as a basis for future research on the topic, once the 
technology develops further, since it is generally hard to tell whether the fourth and fifth 
characteristics are fulfilled by blockchain at this point. Therefore, the results of the paper 
also back criticism of Christensen’s theory regarding its usefulness for predictions. 
This paper suggests that, in the financial services industry, too, the impact of blockchain 
will be significant. However, given the manifoldness of the services that are part of the in-
dustry, it cannot generally be concluded whether the DLT will disrupt the industry. For ex-
ample, in services related to payment methods, blockchain is unlikely to follow disruptive 
pattern, despite the recent hype surrounding blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. However, 
regarding data storage and transfer, the technology might as well follow disruptive pattern 
in the financial services industry just as the application of blockchain solutions has been 
doing in the healthcare industry. 
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Overall, this paper indicates that blockchain shows indicators of disruption in some fields 
but is generally more likely to follow evolutionary trajectories. However, the technology 
needs to develop further before it can be determined what sort of innovation it is. Never-
theless, the impact blockchain has had and will have, is immense, and it will require in-
cumbents’ attention in many industries and fields. 
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Appendix 
Exhibit 1: Low Market Disruptions and New Market Disruptions 
Low Market Disruptions are innovative products or services that target already existing 
customers (Christensen, 2003). However, these customers do not need the same level of 
performance that the high and mainstream end of the market requests. These so-called 
overshoot customers are overserved and, therefore, can usually be targeted with innovative 
technologies which allow a company to provide a product or service of a relatively lower 
quality, but at a lower price. As both the disruptive and the sustaining innovations in a mar-
ket keep improving at a faster pace than the market demands, the number of overshoot cus-
tomers increases (Christensen, 2013). Consequently, more and more of these customers 
can be satisfied with the quality the disruptive technology provides, which ultimately dis-
places the incumbents. 
 
Figure 7. Low Market Disruption (Christensen, 2003, p.44) 
Targeting non-customers of a product or service, New Market Disruptions do not compete 
for market shares with existing incumbents (Christensen, 2003). Therefore, the disruptive 
technology usually convinces these customers with a performance attribute that is not val-
ued by the mainstream market. The costs of the disruptive technology might be higher 
compared to the evolutionary technology, although it performs weaker in the existing value 
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network. However, New Market Disruptions create entirely new value networks, in which 
customers are willing to pay the potentially increased price because the new attribute is 
beneficial for the niche market in which they operate. Continuously improving its perfor-
mance over time, the disruptive technology reaches a level at which it becomes attractive 
for the customers in the old mainstream market as well and displaces the incumbents 
(Christensen & Matzler, 2013). The previously mentioned steam boats serve as an example 
for this type of disruption. 
 
Figure 8. New Market Disruption (Christensen, 2003, p.44) 
Exhibit 2: Adjustments to the Disruption Theory 
As aforementioned, Christensen addressed some of the criticism of his initial theory in 
later versions of The Innovator’s Dilemma and other papers about disruptive innovation. 
More recently, he admitted that his initial version did only mention sustaining and disrup-
tive innovations but forgot about Efficiency Innovations (Tellis, 2006). Additionally, he 
pointed out the possibility of Continuous Innovations, addressing the critique that his initial 
theory considers customer orientation obsolete. 
Efficiency Innovations 
The idea of efficiency innovations is to do more with less (Tellis, 2006). These innovations 
follow the same disruptive pathway as other disruptive innovations and lead to the dis-
placement of incumbents. Unlike New Market Disruptions, they follow the same trajecto-
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ries as the mainstream dominance. However, they eliminate their competitors by innova-
tions that allow them to do more with less. A product or service attribute for example al-
lows them to reach the same, or better, relative result with fewer jobs or at lower costs. Ex-
amples for this are mini-mills in the steel industry or Walmart. 
Continuous Innovations 
By pointing out Continuous Innovations, Christensen aims at defending his theory against 
the accusation that it is an argument against customer orientation (Day, 1999). Instead, he 
writes that outstanding customer orientation is not just about listening to one’s customers, 
but also about anticipating their needs (Tellis, 2006). This anticipation includes constantly 
experimenting and innovating. The underlying goal of this type of innovation is delighting 
the customer, while profit is just a result. Using this model, companies such as Apple, Am-
azon, and Zara have made experimentation and innovation an integral part of their business 
models. This way, they have managed to constantly disrupt their own businesses with inno-
vation. Having made creating value for their customers a top priority, these firms focus on 
long term development and have succeeded for many years. According to Christensen, 
Continuous Innovations offer a way out of The Innovator’s Dilemma and should be 
adopted to prevent a company from failing. 
Exhibit 3: Approaches to Consensus in a Blockchain (Zheng et al., 2018) 
Proof of Work (PoW) 
In this approach to consensus, which is also referred to as mining, each node calculates a 
hash value of the permanently changing block header. To achieve consensus, the calculated 
hash value must be at least as small as a certain given value. Therefore, the nodes continu-
ously calculate the hash value using different nonces until the target is reached. If one par-
ticipant of the decentralized network obtains the required value, the other nodes must mu-
tually confirm the correctness of the value. Once this step is completed, the transactions in 
the new block are validated in case of frauds. If they are validated, the collection of trans-
actions is approved to be the authenticated result and then denoted by a new block in the 
blockchain. 
Proof of Stake (PoS) 
Compared to PoW, PoS is considered to be more energy saving. This derives from the fact 
that users are not required to find a nonce in an unlimited space but rather they are required 
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to prove ownership of the amount of a currency. The underlying idea behind this is the be-
lief that people with higher stakes are less likely to attack the network. As a result of this, 
the selection is based on account balance. However, this is why PoS if often considered to 
be unfair as the richest people are bound to be dominant in the network. Hence, there are 
several solutions that suggest a combination of PoS and PoW.    
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) 
This approach to consensus is based on an algorithm which tolerates byzantine faults. In 
fact, it is able to handle up to one third malicious byzantine replicas. For the creation of a 
blockchain, a new block is determined in every round. In the beginning of each round, a 
so-called primary is selected based on certain rules. The primary is then in charge of order-
ing the transactions. The PBFT process is divided in to three phases which are pre-pre-
pared, prepared and commit. A node would only be able to enter the next of these stages if 
it received votes from at least two thirds of all nodes. Therefore, this consensus mechanism 
requires knowing every participant in a network. 
Exhibit 4: Four Principles of the Blockchain Technology (Zheng et al., 2018) 
Due to the nature of its technology, blockchain is characterized by the following four prin-
ciples (Zheng et al., 2018): 
Decentralization: Conventional transaction systems require a trusted central agency, which 
validates each of the transactions. This high level of centralization leads to performance 
bottlenecks at the central servers. However, blockchain allows the conduct of transactions 
on a P2P basis. The validation is not performed by a central agency but by the nodes. This 
decentralization results in a significant reduction of server cost and performance bottle-
necks. 
Persistency: The nature of a blockchain makes it extremely hard to tamper. This derives 
from the fact that each of the transactions is recorded in blocks distributed all over the net-
work. As an immediate result of the decentralized P2P validation by the nodes, potential 
fraud becomes obvious quickly. 
Anonymity: Deriving from the decentralization the blockchain technology provides, there is 
no longer a central party storing a user’s private information. Within the blockchain net-
work, users communicate and interact with a generated address. Moreover, the technology 
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allows users to create several addresses to avoid identity exposure. Therefore, the technol-
ogy guarantees a certain amount of privacy for the transactions. 
Auditability: Using a timestamp for the validation of transaction, blockchain allows users 
to easily verify and trace the previous records by accessing a node in the distributed net-
work. This guarantees traceability and transparency of the data stored. As previously men-
tioned, the type of a blockchain might restrict this transparency. 
Exhibit 5: Different Types of Blockchain 
Public Blockchains are fully decentralized. In this type of blockchain, anyone in the world 
can read the blockchain and can send transactions to it and can expect to see them included 
if they are valid (Buterin, 2015). Moreover, everyone can participate in the consensus pro-
cess. Therefore, public blockchains are secured by cryptoeconomics which combines eco-
nomic incentives and cryptographic verification using the aforementioned mechanisms.  
Private Blockchains are blockchains where writing permissions are a privilege of a single 
organization. Depending on its application, reading permissions may be either public or re-
stricted. Private blockchain applications may include database management within a single 
company. This type is considered to be the most centralized blockchain. 
In a Consortium Blockchain only a pre-selected set of nodes participates in the consensus 
process. Buterin (2015) provides the example of a consortium of 15 financial institutions of 
which a minimum of ten must sign a block in order for it to be valid. Reading permission 
may be either public or restricted to the participants. This type of blockchain is partially 
decentralized. 
The following table provides a general overview of the three types with regard to Consen-
sus Determination, Reading Permission, Centralization, and Consensus Process1:  
                                                 
 
1 Determines whether permission is required to join the consensus process. 
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Property Public 
Blockchain 
Consortium  
Blockchain 
Private 
Blockchain 
Consensus 
Determination 
All miners Selected Set of 
Nodes 
One Organization 
Reading Permission Public Public or Restricted Public or Restricted 
Centralization No Partial Yes 
Consensus Process Permissionless Permissioned Permissioned 
Table 10. Comparison of Blockchain Types (Zheng et al., 2018, p. 358) 
Exhibit 6: Industries for Which Blockchain will be Crucial 
Due to its mechanics, the blockchain technology is particularly useful when applied as an 
intermediary, used for storing and transferring data, and, as the last years have indicated, 
used as the underlying technology for cryptocurrencies (Käll, 2018; Patel, 2018). Hence, 
this thesis focuses on the disruptive impact of the blockchain technology on these three 
scopes. It is worth noting that these scopes coincide with each other for many real-world 
applications. Moreover, the scopes also indicate which industries are likely to be impacted 
most by the blockchain technology.  
Due to the manifoldness of the technology, possible applications for blockchain can be 
found in almost any industry (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2016). If cryptocurrencies became a 
universally accepted payment method, members of every industry would have to consider 
adapting and accepting this form of payment. However, the extent of the technology’s im-
pact varies in each industry. The transaction-heavy financial services industry, for exam-
ple, will be impacted enormously as it benefits from all three of the aforementioned scopes 
of the technology (Zheng et al., 2018).  
Among the industries that will be influenced by the data management scope of the technol-
ogy are other data driven industries such as the insurance and healthcare industries, and 
fields such as governance and human resources (“Banking Is Only The Beginning: 42 Big 
Industries Blockchain Could Transform”, 2018). Additionally, industries in which copy-
right is crucial, like the film and music industry, are likely to be impacted by this scope of 
the technology. Industries with a high occurrence of trading will be particularly influenced 
by blockchain’s ability to replace intermediaries. Besides the abovementioned financial 
services industry, this group includes the electricity industry, the oil industry, and any other 
industries where purchasing is a crucial part of the supply chain (Perboli, Musso, & Ro-
sano, 2018). 
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Exhibit 7: Level of Blockchain Startup Financing Worldwide 2012-2017 
 
Exhibit 8: Overview on Leading Cryptocurrencies 
# Name Market Cap. in USD 
(as of Jan 04, 2019) 
Price in USD 
(as of Jan 04, 2019) 
1 Bitcoin $66.197.575.060 $3.790,85 
2 Ethereum $15.483.623.073 $148,61 
3 XRP $14.398.553.411 $0,352957 
4 Bitcoin Cash $2.749.025.075 $156,66 
5 EOS $2.401.918.600 $2,65 
6 Stellar $2.174.255.404 $0,113463 
7 Tether $1.902.512.916 $1,02 
8 Litecoin $1.886.596.372 $31,51 
9 Bitcoin SV $1.511.191.571 $86,12 
10 TRON $1.338.188.455 $0,020081 
11 Cardano $1.103.342.622 $0,042556 
12 IOTA $1.030.886.869 $0,370885 
13 Monero $825.583.599 $49,45 
14 Binance Coin $785.105.047 $6,00 
15 Dash $683.880.267 $79,99 
16 NEM $576.181.196 $0,064020 
17 Ethereum Classic $545.745.761 $5,09 
18 NEO $489.086.973 $7,52 
19 Maker $358.938.732 $492,89 
20 Zcash $318.585.144 $56,90 
(Source: “Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalization”, 2019) 
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